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█ Abstract For most philosophers it is “inconceivable” that neural states could give rise to mind. Howev-
er, as Nannini demonstrates, this argument is very weak, because modern physics is full of aspects that are 
radically opposed to conventional thinking. Furthermore, the qualia problem represents a pseudo-
problem which arises, whenever we confound events in our phenomenal world (“actuality”) with events in 
the consciousness-independent world (“reality”). Everything we identify and measure as “material” brain 
structures and functions is a mental construct of a “real” brain inaccessible to us, and as such a mental 
construct it cannot be the true origin of mind. We have to accept that the alleged fundamental property 
differences of the material and the mental world are conventions of our mind. At the same time, we may 
hypothesize that “in reality” mind and consciousness are mental fields as emergent properties of cortical 
electromagnetic fields. 
KEYWORDS: Brain-mind Relationship; Qualia Problem; Actual and Real World; Electromagnetic Fields; 
Mental Fields 
 
█ Riassunto “Materiale” e “mentale” come costrutti cerebrali – Per molti filosofi è inconcepibile che gli stati 
neurali diano origine alla mente. Tuttavia, come Nannini dimostra, l’argomento cui fanno appello è molto 
debole poiché la fisica moderna contempla numerosi aspetti che contraddicono il modo di pensare con-
venzionale. Il problema dei qualia rappresenta inoltre uno pseudo-problema riconducibile al fatto di con-
fondere gli eventi nel nostro mondo fenomenico (l’attualità) con gli eventi di un mondo indipendente dal-
la coscienza (la realtà). Tutto ciò che identifichiamo e misuriamo come strutture “materiali” e funzioni del 
cervello è un costrutto mentale di un cervello “reale” che è a noi inaccessibile. Come tale un costrutto 
mentale non può essere la vera origine della mente. Dobbiamo accettare che le supposte differenze nelle 
proprietà fondamentali del mondo materiale e del mondo mentale siano convenzioni della nostra mente. 
Allo stesso tempo, possiamo ipotizzare che in realtà la mente e la coscienza siano campi mentali che si 
danno quali proprietà emergenti di campi elettromagnetici corticali. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Rapporto mente-corpo; Problema dei qualia; Mondo reale e mondo attuale; Campi elet-
tromagnetici; Campi mentali 
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PROFESSOR NANNINI’S ARTICLE ADDRESSES 
the central topic of the “philosophy of mind”, 
i.e. the possibility – or impossibility – of 
bridging the “fundamental explanatory gap” 
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between mind and brain. This gap is empha-
sized as being “insuperable” not only by dual-
ists who believe that the immaterial mind 
and the material brain represent two onto-
logically different entities, but also by those 
who, like Nannini, accept the naturalistic 
view that mental states are strictly bound to 
brain states. In most cases these latter, as 
“monists”, believe that mental states and 
brain states are nothing but two sides of the 
same coin, a position” called “dual-aspect 
theory” or “property dualism”.  
Numerous philosophers as well as natu-
ralists have adopted this position by calling 
the origin of mind and consciousness (at 
least) in human evolution a miracle, a case of 
“strong”, i.e. inexplicable emergence.1 More 
recently the Australian philosopher David 
Chalmers has reiterated this position. On the 
one hand he accepts that there is much em-
pirical evidence that under earthly conditions 
mental states are strongly linked to brain 
states, but at the same time this is no proof of 
universal necessity, because it is impossible 
to logically deduce that certain brain states 
lead to mental states. Therefore, it cannot 
even be conceived how mental states could 
be constituted by brain states.2  
For Nannini as a mind-brain naturalist 
“inconceivabilty” is a weak argument. In the 
history of science, there are many cases 
where philosophers or scientists called cer-
tain problems “unsolvable in principle” while 
a little later on these problems had been 
solved or at least brought close to a solution.  
In two famous speeches in 1872 and 1880, 
the eminent German scientist Emil du Bois-
Reymond (of Huguenot origin), regarded 
“father of modern neurophysiology”, listed a 
number of problems, which according to him 
despite all efforts would never be solved: (1) 
The essence of matter and energy, (2) the 
origin of motion, (3) the origin of conscious 
perception, (4) the origin of life, (5) the goal-
directedness of nature, (6) human thinking 
and language, and (7) free will. He put his 
skepticism into the famous statement: igno-
ramus et ignorabimus!3 Du Bois-Reymond 
elicited much protest against his “skepti-
cism”, for example by the great mathemati-
cian David Hilbert, and the great biologist 
Ernst Haeckel, who both expressed a positive 
epistemological view by stating “we will 
know”!  
The question is, whether the seven 
“world-riddles” of du Bois-Reymond, or at 
least some of them, have been solved in the 
meantime. Today, the majority of scientists 
believe that the problem of the origin of life 
has been solved by accepting that life origi-
nated from non-living matter on our earth 3-
4 billion years ago without the intervention 
of a mystical vital force, although they would 
admit that a number of problems still exist, 
e.g. whether some of the necessary pre-biotic 
components were likewise formed on earth 
or came to it via meteorites.4  
In a similar vein, many philosophers and 
scientists nowadays believe that the problem 
of “free will” is a pseudo-problem inherited 
from theology, as is evident in Kant’s philoso-
phy, and hold that what people really mean by 
freely-willed actions can be fully explained by 
insight from psychology and neurobiology. 
Similarly, the concept of “goal-directedness” 
in nature has been replaced by modern evolu-
tionary biology by demonstrating that the im-
pression of directional forces in nature results 
from an interplay between genetic variance 
and environmental selection (we have to ad-
mit that in evolutionary biology many sec-
ondary problems still await further clarifica-
tion).  
There remain two complexes of problems, 
where even today many philosophers and 
scientists would admit that there has been 
little, if any, progress, one addressing the 
fundamental physical principles regarding 
matter, energy, gravitation, motion etc. and 
the other one addressing the origin of con-
scious mind.  
Nannini’s article tries to bind these two 
complexes together at least with respect to 
the “inconceivability” argument. He argues 
that there needs to be a “paradigm shift” in 
the mind-brain discussion very similar to 
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what had happened when Einstein developed 
his Special Theory of Relativity (STR) first 
and his General Theory of Relativity (GTR) 
later.  
Einstein was brought to STR by the fact 
that Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism 
contradicted two fundamental assumptions 
of classical physics, namely that there is an 
absolute time running at the same pace in all 
possible physical systems, and that there is an 
absolute, isotropic space against which veloc-
ities of all possible physical systems can relia-
bly be measured.  
The result of the famous Michelson and 
Morley experiment of 1887 that light travels 
at an absolute speed irrespective of the speed 
of all possible physical systems led Einstein to 
his space-time theory and to the abandon-
ment of absolute simultaneity of events. While 
STR had been developed for inertial systems 
and “flat” geodesics (or flat space) only, Ein-
stein extended it to the GTR by generalizing 
the STR principles to accelerated systems and 
curved geodesics as a consequence of mass 
and demonstrating that gravitation is a conse-
quence of curved space-time.  
As illustrated by Nannini, STR and GTR 
were made possible by two facts, namely first 
by the fundamental discrepancies between 
new empirical findings (e.g. properties of 
electromagnetic fields, non-existence of an 
ether as a motionless carrier medium as 
demonstrated by the Michelson-Morley ex-
periment) and classical physical assumptions, 
and second by radically abandoning deeply 
rooted physical concepts regarding absolute 
time and space and gravitational “forces”. It 
was indeed “inconceivable” for most physi-
cists and philosophers of Einstein’s time that 
time is not absolute, that space is not iso-
tropic and that the speed of light was both 
limited and not linearly additive. According-
ly, even eminent physicists and mathemati-
cians had a hard time to accept STR and 
even more GTR.  
However Einstein’s theories provided an 
explanation for why under conditions, where 
velocities are far below the speed of light, 
STR and especially GTR phenomena such as 
time dilation or length contraction are negli-
gible. While STR was experimentally con-
firmed relatively soon, most of GTR re-
mained unproven for a long time until more 
and more observations were made that were 
consistent with the predictions of GTR like 
gravitational time delay, gravitational lenses, 
black holes, etc.  
More and more previously skeptical peo-
ple became convinced because of the fact 
that the phenomena and laws of classical 
Newtonian physics could be demonstrated as 
special cases of more general principles de-
scribed by STR and GTR. The illusion creat-
ed by classical physics consisted predomi-
nantly in the belief that the way things hap-
pening in ordinary life and on earth holds for 
all circumstances in the entire universe. To 
what degree is this situation found in classi-
cal vs. relativistic physics (let alone quantum 
mechanics) applicable to the situation found 
in philosophy of mind and cognitive neuro-
science?  
In his article, Nannini emphasizes a 
strong similarity between the two fields. In a 
certain sense, this is correct. In the same way, 
as physicists and philosophers of Einstein’s 
time stated that the claims of STR and espe-
cially GTR were “absurd”, “inconceivable”, 
“mentally insane”, etc., in these days brain 
scientists and physicalist-naturalist philoso-
phers proposing a naturalistic explanation of 
the origin of mind and psyche in the brain or 
of free will are attacked by other philoso-
phers using more or less the same words. 
Their arguments are based on the same be-
lief, i.e. that things are the way we perceive 
them.  
Their main argument goes: We are una-
ware of neurons, while we are thinking, and 
we experience no limbic activity while we are 
in love. Conversely, when neurobiologists 
carry out measurements, they don’t see 
thoughts, romantic love – what they see are 
firing neurons, the release of transmitters, 
hormones etc. Generally speaking, they may 
most accurately study brain processes, but 
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they will never encounter phenomena that 
appear exclusively at the level of self-
experience (thoughts, emotions, decisions 
etc). When there is mind, there is no brain, 
and when there is brain, there is no mind.  
Under favorable conditions I may be able 
to demonstrate a strict correlation between 
brain states and mental states. If I am lucky, I 
may even predict the occurrence of certain 
mental states (experienced by myself in a 
self-experiment or on the basis of report 
from others) based on certain brain activities 
– sometimes 10 seconds before the appear-
ance of the mental states. In an impressive 
experiment, electric stimulation of a certain 
brain region (the pre-SMA region of the cor-
tex) had the consequence that the subject or 
patient executed a movement (e.g., raising 
his/her arm) and explained that he/she just 
wanted to do this.5 Thus the subjective feel-
ing of free will can be elicited electrically in 
the brain. 
All this might convince a skeptical philos-
opher that contrary to classical dualism men-
tal states are inseparably bound to brain 
states. He might even refrain from the posi-
tion of interactive dualism, because this con-
cept cannot be reconciled with the fact that 
brain activities precede mental activities in a 
systematic way. Will he/she then become an 
adherer of functional reductionism in the 
sense that mental states are reducible to 
functional states, and that these functional 
states are reducible to brain states, as de-
scribed by Nannini?6  
Not necessarily. On the basis of an im-
mense wealth of evidence, we may assume 
that every mental state is preceded and ac-
companied by identifiable brain activities. 
However, whether we are allowed to speak in 
this context about a functional reduction of 
brain states is an open question.  
We may state that thinking is impossible 
without activity in the prefrontal cortex com-
bined with synchronization of the neurons in-
volved and oscillatory phenomena within the 
gamma band, etc. (as stated in Nannini’s arti-
cle), but at present we must admit that with 
respect to synchronization and oscillation 
phenomena we do not know to which degree 
they are really necessary for thinking, and cer-
tainly they are not sufficient.  
The same holds for activity of the thala-
mus, the reticular formation, the release of 
neurotransmitters and neuromodulators. If 
we block one of these processes (e.g. by ap-
plying anesthetics), we may even abolish con-
scious thinking, but at present there is no 
universally accepted theory of such effects. In 
all these phenomena, there may be hitherto 
unknown factors. Thus, a functional reduc-
tion of consciousness is at least incomplete at 
present.  
What we can firmly state, however, is that 
in all cases where we find a close relationship 
between mental states and brain states, phys-
ical laws, e.g. regarding the conservation of 
energy and impulse, are fully obeyed. Con-
sciousness is metabolically very expensive, 
because it requires fast changes in synaptic 
coupling and fast restitution of certain 
transmitters and modulators. This tells us: 
however difficult it may be to understand the 
relationship between mental states and brain 
states, this relationship occurs within the 
framework of physical principles.  
Thus, we can safely adopt a physicalist 
stance by stating that mental processes are 
some (even strange) sort of physical process-
es, because by definition processes that un-
derlie the laws of physics are physical ones.7  
But can we arrive at a true reductionist 
physicalism? I don’t think so, because the 
“fundamental explanatory gap” as mentioned 
above, appears to remain. The best we can 
reach is an operational explanation of mental 
states: a given mental state will arise, if cer-
tain neurobiological events occur. However, 
did we explain how it feels when we have that 
mental state (thoughts, emotions, decisions)?  
Certainly not. Even if we identified all neu-
rophysiological and neuropharmacological 
factors leading to being in love plus all interac-
tions of the brain with its body and with the 
environment, we would not explain the feeling 
of that state, the qualia, as having properties 
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that apparently are fundamentally different 
from anything else in physical nature.  
We may object that such “fundamental” 
differences in properties are not exclusively 
found in the brain-mind relationship, but oc-
cur as “emergent properties” at all levels of 
nature, especially when we proceed from the 
level of quantum mechanics to the macro-
physical word on earth and within our solar 
system and finally to large-scale conditions of 
relativistic physics. But even when passing 
from non-living to living nature, phenomena 
occur which for thousands of years had been 
regarded as “fundamentally different”. Thus, 
consciousness may be understood as an 
emergent, albeit not a metaphysical property 
of the physical brain.  
However, our skeptical philosopher could 
bring forward a seemingly ultimate argument 
to demonstrate that the brain-mind relation-
ship is indeed fundamentally different from 
anything else in the world. The emergence of 
new properties at the transition from quan-
tum mechanics to macrophysical and finally 
to relativistic levels can be – and in many 
cases has been – demonstrated empirically 
either by observations or experiments, for 
example when we study the properties of el-
ementary particles or of objects moving at 
near-light speed.  
By carrying out such observations or ex-
periments, we remain within the domain of 
physical observations, how different they 
may appear, and we can demonstrate under 
which conditions relativistic processes turn 
into processes where classical Newtonian 
physics are approximately valid. This howev-
er, is impossible when relating the properties 
of the brain and properties of our mind. 
They appear to belong to two fundamentally 
different, i.e. non-overlapping domains, with 
no conceivable transition between them. 
This line of arguments, however, is based 
on a fundamental epistemological error. This 
error consists in the following: There is little 
doubt that all conscious perceptual, cogni-
tive, emotional states result from the activity 
of neurons and neuron ensembles under very 
specific conditions. Therefore, they must be 
regarded as constructs of the brain constitut-
ing what I have called “actuality” (Wirklich-
keit in German),8 and in numerous cases neu-
robiologists are able to demonstrate how the-
se constructs occur in the brain.  
However, if we accept that our conscious 
acts are brain constructs, their properties 
should not be mistaken as properties of the 
“real” external world. This is commonly ac-
cepted in the case of colors, where everybody 
is willing to admit that colors” do not exist in 
the outside world”, but are constructs of the 
brain. But this is equally true for the per-
ceived difference between “mental” phenom-
ena (thoughts, memories), bodily sensations 
(moving my arm) and “material” events of 
the outside world (stones, tables, planets), i.e. 
these phenomenal differences likewise are 
constructs of the brain, and the neurobiolo-
gists may demonstrate that different brain 
regions are involved in the representation of 
events in the outside world, of our body and 
of our mental acts.  
The different representations of these 
three worlds (environment, body, mind) de-
velop slowly during the development of brain 
and mental functions. The first fundamental 
distinction a brain has to make is between 
body, which can be controlled directly and 
gives sensory feedback, and environment, 
which as “non-body” cannot be directly con-
trolled and does not give sensory feedback.  
At a subsequent stage, the child learns 
that there are states that are neither envi-
ronment nor body and are called thoughts, 
ideas, memories, imaginations, acts of will 
etc. by the adults. It is very important for the 
child not to confound these mental states 
with “real” things, and the step from a magic 
world view to realism is important for the in-
tellectual development of the child. The dis-
tinction between a material world (including 
– with some problems – the body) and an 
immaterial, mental world again is a construct 
of our brain.  
As a consequence, we have to accept that 
those brains which I study as a neurobiologist 
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are likewise constructs of my brain which like 
all objects that can be seen, heard, touched, 
smelled or tasted belong to the “material” 
world, are strictly separated by the brain 
from “immaterial” mental events. As brain 
constructs, these neurons when perceived un-
der the microscope or in an electrophysiolo-
gical experiment trivially do not give rise to 
mental states (constructs do not construct!), 
rather this is done by “real neurons”.  
Accordingly, when a philosopher asks the 
question how mind could originate from 
neurons that can be perceived, he/she asks a 
question that is based on a category mistake. 
Since the brain, over years of development of 
the infant brain, has put much effort into a 
clear distinction between “material” and 
“immaterial” things (both being constructs), 
later it must appear fully enigmatic to our 
mind how those neurons could give rise to 
the mind (which they don’t!). When a phi-
losophers states that there is a fundamental 
gap between the properties of brain states 
and of mental states, he/she falling into an 
epistemological trap the human brain has 
built while developing a phenomenal (“actu-
al”) world.  
Thus, the epistemologically correct ques-
tion would be how “real” neurons existing in 
a world independent of our mind give rise to 
mind. However, together with Kant, we have 
to accept that the “true” nature of the world 
including the real neurons is inaccessible to 
us. We may hope that the properties of these 
“real” neurons are not far from those we per-
ceive and investigate in our phenomenal 
world, but their relationship with mental 
states must remain undefined.  
In humans (and probably in some ani-
mals), “real” brains and neurons may be as-
sumed to have properties from which mental 
states originate, as we experience them. In 
that sense, mind can be regarded as an 
“emergent property” of “real” neuronal struc-
tures like the primate/human cortex.9  
Summing up, based on neurobiological 
evidence we recognize that mental states are 
inseparably bound to brain states, and that 
specific brain states not only parallel, but 
precede specific mental states. Furthermore, 
we need to treat mental states as “physical”, 
because their appearance strictly obeys the 
fundamental laws of physics. This explains 
why brain states influence mental states, and 
vice versa.  
Finally, despite all progress in the neuro-
sciences, subjective experience as something 
“immaterial” opposed to the “material” 
world, seems to persist. However, this turns 
out to be a fallacy of our brain, because what 
our mind considers to be material and imma-
terial are brain constructs. Brains and neu-
rons as physical entities can be considered 
neither material nor immaterial, because the-
se are distinctions created by the brain for 
practical reasons. Expressing it in Kant’s 
terminology: neurons are “material” and 
mind “immaterial” for us.  
Since in our “actuality” we empirically 
and consistently discover that some brain 
states give rise to conscious mental states, it 
is most reasonable (although can never been 
proven objectively) that under very specific 
circumstances “real” neurons possess the 
ability to produce consciousness as basis of 
our actuality.  
 
█  Notes 
 
1 See, e.g., K. LORENZ, Behind the Mirror. A Search 
for a Natural History of Human Knowledge, Mari-
ner Books, 1973; K.R. POPPER, J. ECCLES, The Self 
and Its Brain, Springer, Heidelberg/ Berlin/New 
York 1984. 
2 See D.J. CHALMERS, The Conscious Mind. In 
Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford/ New York 1996. 
3 “We don’t know and we will never know”. 
4 See G. ROTH, The Long Evolution of Brains and 
Minds, Springer, Dordrecht/Berlin/Heidelberg/ 
New York 2013. 
5 See M. DESMURGET, K.T. REILLY, N. RICHARD, 
A. SZATHMARI, C. MOTTOLESE, A. SIRIQU, Move-
ment Intention after Parietal Cortex Stimulation in 
Humans, in: «Science», vol. CCCXXIV, n. 5928, 
2009, pp. 811-813. 
6 See S. NANNINI, Time and Consciousness in Co-
gnitive Naturalism, in: «Rivista Internazionale di 
 
The “Material” and the “Mental” as Brain Constructs 
 
503 
 
Filosofia e Psicologia», vol. VI, n. 3, pp. 458-473, 
here p. 466. 
7 See G. ROTH, The Long Evolution of Brains and 
Minds, cit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 See G. ROTH, Das Gehirn und seine Wirklich-
keit,Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1994. 
9 For details see G. ROTH, The Long Evolution of 
Brains and Minds, cit. 
